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11.1  Introduction 
On March 14,  2001 the number of British people claiming unemploy- 
ment benefits fell below 1 million for the first time in twenty-five years. To 
celebrate the event, the prime minister gave a speech on the New Deal. The 
March 15,2001 edition of the Evening Standard quoted the prime minister 
as saying “Nobody says to me they’re on a skivvy’ scheme. The sort of lan- 
guage used about employment programs in the 1980s is not used about the 
New Deal.” 
This paper addresses two questions. Does New Labour’s flagship employ- 
ment policy represent a significant break from the past-and  has it worked? 
In the  1980s and 1990s U.K. governments introduced major changes in 
the levels and conditions for receipt of unemployment benefits. I examine 
the effects of a large labor market program that was introduced (initially in 
pilot form) in January 1998, the year after the election of the new govern- 
ment. The New Deal involves a cluster of different policies designed to get- 
ting the jobless (especially the young unemployed) back to work. 
Since April 1998 all individuals aged between eighteen and twenty-four 
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who have claimed unemployment benefits (called Job Seekers Allowance or 
JSA)  enter the New Deal program. There are two stages. First, there is a 
“Gateway” period, where the claimant is given intensive help with job 
search. Those who do  not secure an unsubsidized job during this stage go 
on to the second stage of New Deal options that include subsidized full- 
time training or education, a wage subsidy paid to the employer, voluntary 
work,  or placement  with  the Environmental  Task  Force (government- 
provided employment). It is a mandatory program-there  is no fifth op- 
tion for remaining on benefits. 
In this paper I focus on evaluating the success of the New Deal program 
in moving people into  jobs. In the short run this occurs in two main ways. 
First, there is an enhanced job search monitored by a meeting every two 
weeks with a personal advisor. The  job search could be increased by (1) the 
more credible threat of benefit sanctions, (2) the provision  of a greater 
quality and quantity of information on vacancies, or (3)  the psychological 
effect of being connected again with the labor market. Second, the wage 
subsidy reduces the cost to the employer of taking on an unemployed per- 
son (by about 40-50  percent). 
The job search aspect has many antecedents in benefit reforms initiated 
under the previous Conservative administration. In particular, the Restart 
initiative in 1986 began a new era of increased monitoring of the unem- 
ployed (see section 11.3). The New Deal has continued this tightening up 
of the work-search rules, but has combined it with much more generous 
funding of job search assistance and subsidized options. For young people 
there is now effectively a time limit on benefit receipt. The wage-subsidy el- 
ement also has antecedents in Britain (and elsewhere) that I discuss briefly 
in section 11.3. 
I draw on results using a simple difference-in-differences approach ex- 
ploiting two sources of identification. The eligibility for the New Deal is 
age related, so we can compare outflows by different age groups before and 
after the New Deal was introduced. Additionally, the New Deal was intro- 
duced earlier in some areas, so we can compare young people in these pilot 
areas to young people in nonpilot areas. There are numerous factors that 
may bias these estimates that are discussed, including selectivity, differen- 
tial macro trends, job quality, substitution, and general equilibrium effects. 
I have some things to say about the other parts of the New Deal program 
(such as training), but the truth is that it is still in its early days. The long- 
run success of the program will in large part depend on its ability to en- 
hance the productivity and employability of people going through the op- 
tions. Publicly available data at the time of writing ends in 1999, so we are 
only just starting to observe the labor market performance of those leaving 
the twelve-month education and training options. 
The results suggest that the reforms have successfully increased net em- 
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cent more likely per period to gain jobs as a result of the New Deal (i.e., the 
probability of a young man unemployed for six months or more obtaining 
a job rose from about 5 percent a month to 6 percent a month). A sub- 
stantial part of this effect is attributed to the wage subsidy option, but there 
is also some job assistance effect. An initial cost benefit analysis suggests 
that the program is worth continuing on efficiency grounds alone. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1  1.2 gives some background, 
placing the U.K.’s labor market in historical and comparative perspective. 
Section 11.3  gives the history and details of the reforms. Section 11.4 offers 
some results on the evaluation of the New Deal. Section 11.5 gives the cost- 
benefit calculations, and section 11.6 offers some concluding remarks. 
11.2  General U.K. Labor Market Background 
In this section I sketch out some features of the labor market of the 
United Kingdom in historical and comparative perspective. 
Figure 11.1 displays the total unemployed claimant count since 1960, 
and figure 11.2 shows the standard International Labour Organization 
(ILO) unemployment rates from 1978 onward. In many respects the United 
Kingdom is similar to other European countries. There has been a steady 
upward drift of unemployment since 1960, with a very large increase post- 
1979. Until the 199Os, the trough of each recession was associated with 
higher unemployment than the previous downturn. The expansion since 
1993 has pushed the number of unemployed below that of the previous 
cycle to levels not seen since the last Labour government (1974-1979). 
Another feature of U.K. unemployment is its volatility. The United King- 
dom has experienced sharp boom-bust cycles. There were deep recessions 
in the early 1980s and early 1990s and a fast boom in the mid- to late 1980s. 
There was a similar boom in the late 1990s and early 2000s, although with 
lower levels of wage and price inflation. 
Currently U.K. unemployment is relatively low by Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) standards  (see column [  13, 
table 1  1.1).  This has been a relatively recent phenomenon, however. Between 
1983 and 1996, U.K. unemployment rates have been above the OECD av- 
erage, certainly higher than Germany’s (which has never fully recovered 
from the shock of reunification in 1989), although lower than France’s.* 
Furthermore, in terms of its long-term unemployment rates, the United 
Kingdom appears much closer to a European country than to the United 
States. 
Across almost all OECD countries youth unemployment is higher than 
2. Between 1983  and 1996 OECD average unemployment was 8.2 percent-9.7  percent in 
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Fig. 11.2  Unemployment-claimant  and ILO measures 
Sources: Data on ILO defined unemployment were taken from the LFS. Data underlying the figure is available at http://www.statis- 
tics.g0v.uk and Wells (2000). 
Notes: The ILO definition is based on asking out of work individuals whether they would be available and prepared to accept a job 
within two weeks. The claimant count is the number of people who are receiving unemployment benefits (called Job Seekers Allowance 
since 1994). Although the series track each other relatively well, there will be some people who are 1LO unemployed who will not be 
in the claimant count (e.g., if they left their job voluntarily, this will disqualify them from benefits receipt for a period of time). Simi- 
larly, some individuals  could be claiming unemployment benefits without genuinely searching for a job. 466  John Van Reenen 
Table 11.1  Benefits, Sanctions, and Unemployment: International  Comparisons  (“YO) 
ILO  Replacement  Sanction 
Unemployment  Rate  Rate 
Rate (c. 1999)  (c. 1997-1998)  ( 1994-1 995) 





























































Sources: International Labor Organization (ILO) unemployment rate 1999 from Nickell and 
van Ours (2000). Replaccment rate from Martin (1998, table 4). Sanction rate from Grubb 
(2000), except for the Netherlands (Boone and van Ours 2000) and Sweden. 
Notes: Replacement rate calculated as benefit entitlements before tax as a percentage of pre- 
vious earnings before tax; first month of unemployment for a person on average earnings, as- 
suming that person is forty years old, has a dependent spouse, has two children, and started 
work at eighteen. These are all 1994-1995 (except for Japan, 1996). Sanctions rate is defined 
as total sanctions during benefit periods as a proportion of the average stock of claims 
1997-1998. n.a. = not available. 
unemployment for prime-age individuals. There is a relatively high pro- 
portion of young Britons in jobs and a low proportion of young people in 
school. There is also a large proportion of British youth that are neither 
in school nor in the labor force (the “idle”). The United Kingdom has the 
highest numbers of eighteen-year-old men in this category.’ Moreover, the 
United Kingdom has had the largest increase in the proportion of “idle” 
youth since 1984. 
Another feature of the youth labor market is its sensitivity to the business 
cycle. The  unemployment  rates  of  the  younger  group (see figure  11.3) 
broadly mirror the overall picture, but are more cyclically sensitive. This is 
also true for the employment rates (see Bell, Blundell, and Van Reenen 1999). 
Turning to wage rates, it is well known that there has been a large in- 
crease in earnings inequality in the United Kingdom since 1979 (Schmitt, 
3. The proportion idle was 8.4 percent in the United Kingdom in 1997, compared to 2.3 
percent in 1984. In  1997 the OECD average was 1.8 percent-5.6  percent in  the United 
States, 4.2 percent in Germany, 3.3 percent in France, and 9.1 percent in Italy (see Blanch- 







Fig. 11.3  Claimant unemployment amongst eighteen-twenty-four-year-olds 
Source: Data underlying the figure is available at http://www.statistics.gov.uk and Wells (2000). 468  John Van Reenen 
1995; Gosling, Machin, and Meghir 2000). This has occurred between the 
younger and older age groups, even within gender and skill classes. The up- 
rating of many benefit levels (e.g., the state pension and unemployment be- 
nefit) in Britain was pegged to price inflation instead of earnings inflation 
from 1979-1980.  Also, there were real cuts of about 10 percent in most 
means-tested benefits. This has lead to a fall in the replacement rate rela- 
tive to other countries (the second column of table 11.1). 
To summarize this section somewhat boldly, the United Kingdom has 
enjoyed lower than average unemployment rates since the mid- to late 
1990s than other European countries. Over a longer time frame unemploy- 
ment has been about average and more volatile than other OECD coun- 
tries. Youth unemployment is slightly better than average, but there are a 
surprisingly large number of young people in the United Kingdom who 
are neither in school nor actively seeking work. Wages are relatively low for 
young British workers, but so are unemployment benefits. 
11.3  Institutions of U.K. Unemployment Benefit Regime 
11.3.1  The New Deal in Historical Context 
Table 11.2 displays the evolution  of the U.K. unemployment benefit 
regime. The network of the labor exchanges was first founded in 1910 and 
administered the first unemployment benefits from 1912. Worries about 
the disincentive effects of unemployment benefit persisted from its foun- 
dation. The work test was a fundamental part of the labor exchange but 
was seen as more humane than the workhouses that preceded it. As Bev- 
eridge 0909) put it 
The labour exchange opens the way  for “depauperisation” more hu- 
mane, less costly and more effective than that of the workhouse test- 
the  way of making the finding of work easy instead of making relief hard. 
(2  1 5-2  16) 
The work-test requirement  became  less pressing  during the postwar 
“Golden Years”  of low unemployment.  From the late  1960s, however, 
there appeared to be  a shift in attitude toward  unemployment benefits 
away from being a temporary palliative of social insurance and toward be- 
ing a more permanent redistribution from those with work to the jobless. 
Additionally, the role of the Employment Service was reoriented toward 
being a service provider to employers and employees. It attempted to re- 
gain a share in the market for filling vacancies because of the fear that 
employers were losing interest in notifying job centers of vacancies. The 
Employment Service focused less on finding jobs for the difficult to place 
long-term unemployed. 
The  most  important  consequence  of  these  changes  was  that  the Table 11.2  Timeline of U.K. Unemployment Benefit Reforms 
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Labor exchange network founded by Winston Churchill 
Unemployment benefit introduced and administered by labor exchanges 
All claimants had to prove “normally in employment, genuinely seeking employ- 
ment and unable to obtain it” 
National Insurance Act 
Visit Job Center once a week (twice a week before) 
Benefit Office and Job Center split 
13% cut in Employment Service staff 
Visit Job Center only once every two weeks 
Visiting Job Center voluntary 
50% cutback in numbers of staff to enforce work search (fall of 940 to 550 in Unem- 
ployment Registration Office) 
Restart mandatory job-related interview; increases in staff (especially for checking 
fraud); vacancies displayed in benefit office; verification letters sent to unemployed; 
maximum period of benefit disqualification extended to 13 weeks (was 6 weeks 
January-pilots;  July-nationwide  for those with 1  + year unemployment; Octo- 
ber-extended  to all with 6 months unemployment 
Maximum period of benefit disqualification extended to 26 weeks 
Eligibility requirements increased over “actively  seeking work” (must look every 
week); cannot refuse “unsuitable” jobs paying less than going rate 
Employment Service given more independence by being made into an “arm’s- 
length agency”; performance targets (e.g.. on referrals) 
Mandatory one-week  job course for unemployed >2 years 
“Stricter benefit regime” doubles number of sanctionslreferrals 
Job Seekers’  Allowance (JSA) is the new legal framework based around Job Seekers 
Agreement: Visit Job Center once every two weeks; more random checking over 
search; after 3 months unemployment have to search for other occupations 
Various compulsory programs (1-2-1, Workwise, Project Work) 
New Deal for Young People (pilots in January, nation rollout in April) 
New Deal for long-term unemployed-all  those unemployed for over 2 years (July) 
National Minimum Wage introduced at f3.60 for adults and at L3 for youths 
New Deal for over-50s piloted 
New Deal for over-50s national rollout 
New Deal made a permanent feature of U.K. unemployment benefit regime 
191  3-1986) 
Sources: Wells (2000), Price (2000). 
Note; Important reforms are italicized. 470  John Van Reenen 
work-search requirements were less strictly enforced. The function of job 
centers (job search) and benefit offices (paying benefits) were split in 1974, 
and they were increasingly located on different premises. An indicator of the 
relaxation in work search is the number of referrals of unemployed people 
suspected of not searching for work-this  stood at 28,270 in 1968, and, de- 
spite a big increase in unemployment, fell to 5,603 by  1976 (Price 2000). 
Surprisingly, the advent of Mrs. Thatcher’s administration actually re- 
inforced this trend. In 1982 the compulsion to visit a Job Centre if some- 
one claimed unemployment benefit was withdrawn. Cutbacks in public 
expenditure reduced the numbers of staff to monitor the work-search re- 
quirements and help match the unemployed with jobs.4  These administra- 
tive changes, combined with the huge increase in unemployment in the 
early 1980s (see figure 11.  l), swamped the ability of the Employment Ser- 
vice to enforce work search. In terms of gross domestic product (GDP)  the 
U.K. recession troughed in 1981, but despite 5 years of recovery, claimant 
unemployment only peaked in 1986. 
A major period of benefit reform began in 1986. The introduction of the 
Restart program made interviews with the Employment Service a con- 
dition of benefit receipt  for all those whose unemployment claims had 
reached a duration of twelve months or more. These were piloted in Janu- 
ary and rolled out nationally in July. Also, in 1986 the government extended 
the unemployment insurance disqualification period for those deemed to 
have left their jobs voluntarily from six to thirteen weeks (this was further 
increased to twenty-six weeks in 1988 and is currently six  month^).^ 
Since this point, there has been a successive tightening of  the work- 
search requirement. In October 1986 Restart interviews were extended to 
all those unemployed in excess of six months, with repeated interviews af- 
ter every subsequent six months. In 1991 mandatory job courses for the 
very long-term unemployed were introduced. In 1994 the number of sanc- 
tions doubled under the “stricter benefit regime.” 
These changes were consolidated in a new legal framework under JSA, 
introduced in 1996. A range of measures was introduced to improve job 
search,6  and there were more checks over eligibility. 
One indicator of the effect of these cumulative changes has been to reduce 
4. In the early 1980s large numbers were encouraged to  leave the unemployment rolls and 
draw other forms of benefits (and therefore exit the labor market). This gave the appearance 
of reducing unemployment. For example, the 1983 budget allowed men over sixty to move on 
to a higher benefit rate if they signed off  of unemployment benefits and on to long-term sup- 
plementary benefits. Supplementary  benefits required that the recipients did nol look for work 
(Wells 2000)!  The numbers of invalidity benefits rose by 300,000 between 1984 and 1988. 
5.  Restart also gave menu of options to help get people into work-short  courses, training, 
job clubs, and a Jobstart subsidy (a f20  bonus to the unemployed person if they took a low- 
payingjob). 
6. Examples are the Jobseekers’ agreements, the enhanced advisory interventions, and that 
the unemployed could not refuse jobs outside their own occupation after three months. and 
so on. Active Labor Market Policies and the British New Deal  471 
the proportion of people seeking work who actually claim benefits. Schmitt 
and Wadsworth (1999) show that in 1983 90 percent of ILO unemployed 
men (i.e., those who had actively sought work within the last two weeks) re- 
ceived unemployment benefits, compared to only 80 percent in 1993. 
Previous U.K. governments had experimented with wage subsidies. The 
common feature of these schemes was the payment of a fixed weekly sub- 
sidy, typically of around E50 or &60  for the initial months of employment 
of a long-term unemployed individual. This was sometimes payable to the 
individual (Jobstart allowance and Jobmatch) and sometimes to the em- 
ployer (Workstart). In addition, an employer’s National Insurance (the 
main U.K. payroll tax) contributions holiday  for the long-term unem- 
ployed was introduced in April 1996. Prior to the New Deal none of these 
schemes were very well funded, and all have suffered from low take-up. For 
example, in 1996 only 1 percent of all U.K. active labor market funds were 
spent on wage subsidies, compared to an European Union (EU) average of 
10 percent (Martin 1998). 
11.3.2  The Elements of the New Deal 
The New Deal program has been targeted at specific groups of the un- 
employed, with an emphasis on the young (eighteen- to twenty-four-year- 
olds), long-term unemployed (eighteen months or more), lone parents, and 
disabled people. Pilots for the New Deal for Young People began in Janu- 
ary 1998, and the program took effect at the national level beginning in 
April 1998. The number of young people on the New Deal peaked at just 
fewer than 150,000  in July 1999 and stood at 86,200 in September 2002. 
The windfall tax on the privatized utilities raised E5.2 billion between 
1997 and 1999, and all of these funds were hypothecated to financing New 
Deals of some variety. Table 11.3 shows the government’s estimates of the 
allocation of windfall tax receipts to different elements of the program. 
The New Deal for Young People received about E1.5 billion by the end of 
March 2002. 
It is tempting to simply divide the cost of the New Deal by the estimate 
number of new jobs in section 11.4 (about 17,250) to find a “cost per job 
created.” This would imply that the scheme was expensive (e.g., using the 
estimates in section 11.4 of about E18,550 per job in 1999-2000).  Such a 
calculation is misleading, however, as participants of the New Deal op- 
tions would have been claiming JSA, and these costs (and others) must be 
deducted from the gross costs in table 11.4 to get an estimate of the net ex- 
chequer cost. We  perform an explicit cost-benefit calculation in section 
11.5 to address this issue. This suggests that the actual social cost per ad- 
ditional employee is under E4,OOO  (E68.1 million/l7,250) and, more impor- 
tantly, that social benefits exceeded social costs. 
The program is composed of several parts, with different options offered 
to different groups of the unemployed. The New Deal for Young People is 472  John Van Reenen 
Table 11.3  Allocation of the Windfall Tax, 1997-1998 to 2001-2002  (spending by program 
in fmillions) 
Program  1997-1998  1998-1999  1999 2000  2000-2001  2001-2002  1997-2002 
~  ~~ 
New Deal for 18- to 
24-year-olds 
New Deal for those 
25 and over 
New Deal for those 
50 and over 
New Deal for single 
parents 
New Deal for disabled 
people 
New Deal for partners of 
unemployed people 
New Deal for schools 
Child care 






Windfall tax receipts 
50  210  320  440  460  1,480 
10  110  160  320  600  0 
40  0  0  0  20  20 
0  20  50  60  90  220 
















































2,600  2,600 
Note: ONE indicates “ONE stop gateway.” 
compulsory for all those aged eighteen-twenty-four  who have been receiv- 
ing the JSA for more than six months. Figure 11.4 summarizes the treat- 
ment in a flow diagram. Initially, individuals enter a Gateway period, 
where they are assigned a personal adviser who gives them extensive assis- 
tance with the job search. If the unemployed person is still on JSA at the 
end of the Gateway period (formally, a maximum of four months),’ they are 
offered up to four options: 
1. Entry into full-time education or training for up to twelve months for 
those without basic qualifications (without loss of benefits); 
2.  A job for six months with a voluntary sector employer (paid a wage 
or allowance at least equal to JSA plus E400 spread over the six months); 
3. A job with the Environmental Task Force (paid a wage or allowance 
at least equal to JSA plus E400 spread over the six months); or 
4.  A subsidy to a prospective employer for six months, with training for 
at least one day per week (E60 per week plus an additional E750 training 
subsidy spread over the six months). 
7. In practice the Gateway period can last for longer than the official maximum of four 
months. Table 11.4  Level and Composition of Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) in the Group of Seven between 1985 and 1996 
Spending on 
Spending on Public  Spending on Youth  Direct Job Creation 
Spending on ALMP  Spending on ALMP per  Employment Service as a  Measures as a  in the Public Sector 
Yn  of All ALMP  Yn  of All ALMP  as a Yn  of All ALMP  as a YO  of GDP  Person Unemployed” 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 




































































































~  ~~~~ 
Source: Martin (1998), tables 1,2, and 5. 
Notes: n.a. = not available. ALMPs include public employment service, youth measures, public-sector job creation, labor market training (for employed and un- 
employed adults), wage subsidies to private-sector employment, and measures for the disabled (last three items not shown in table). 
“ALMP  per person unemployed is normalized on output per head. Normalizing on productivity is in order to control for the fact that more productive countries 
will have higher wages, so the figure is comparable to a “replacement rate.” This indicator is commonly used by the OECD and in the cross-country analysis of 
Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) and others. 
b1987. 
‘Unweighted average. 










If an option is refused, the claimant is liable to suffer a benefits sanction. 
Initially, sanctions take the form of withdrawal of benefits for two weeks, 
and further refusals may result in repeated benefit sanctions. individuals 
returning to unemployment within thirteen weeks after leaving an option 
go onto the “follow-through’’ program of job assistance, which is essen- 
tially the same as the Gateway. 
individuals can enter options at any time after the sixth month of JSA. 
The official guidance was that the first month of the Gateway was confined 
to unsubsidized employment. The second month would then focus on ed- 
ucation and training and the third month on the subsidized job option.  The 
public-employment option was only to be used as a last resort in the fourth 
month. in practice this schema was not rigidly adhered to. 
Out of the four options, education and training has been the most pop- 
ular (about 40 percent of all those who had joined the New Deal options 
by the end of April 1999 chose education and training). The employer’s op- 
tion had a much lower take-up than anticipated (only 20 percent of all 
those in options). The reasons for this low take-up is uncertain, but it is 
worth noting that low take-up has often been a problem for wage-subsidy 
schemes in other countries. Possible reasons include the following: (1) The 
U.K. economy was in a prolonged expansion. The crop of unemployed 
who fail to get unsubsidized jobs even after the Gateway period may have 
very poor basic skills, making them very unattractive to employers; (2) the 
requirement to have formal training may impose high costs on employers; Active Labor Market Policies and the British New Deal  475 
(3)  the Employment Service has had  little experience in handling job- 
subsidy schemes; and (4)  the failure to secure a job during the Gateway pe- 
riod might generate a stigma effect on the individuals. 
11.3.3 
In general there has been a paucity of high quality evaluations of U.K. 
labor market reforms, compared with the United States. Random assign- 
ment has encountered serious opposition due to a mixture of political and 
ethical objections. In this respect the United Kingdom is more typical of 
other European countries8 “Evaluations” usually take the form of surveys 
of participants. Obviously, there is no obvious comparison group, so any 
counterfactual is purely speculative. 
There are several macroeconometric  evaluations where the policy is 
essentially indicated by a set of time dummies. For example, using a time 
series model  the  Employment  Service (Sweeney and  McMahon  1998) 
claimed that the rule changes in JSA reduced claimant unemployment by 
about 15,000 to 20,000. Large positive effects of  Restart were found by 
Dicks and Hatch (1989) and Disney et al. (1991). More recently Riley and 
Young (2001a,b) found moderate effects of the New Deal for Young People 
when they used a macro approach (about 28,000 extra jobs).9 
The major problem with these macro approaches is that (aside from con- 
ventional aggregation biases) there are many other macroeconomic events 
occurring simultaneously with the introduction of labor market programs. 
It is extremely difficult to disentangle the program effect from these macro 
shocks. For example, the U.K. economy experienced a very sharp upturn 
in the late 1980s (see figure 11.2) that would have raised employment in the 
absence of the Restart program. 
Fortunately, however, there have been useful microeconometric evalua- 
tions of the Restart initiative using microdata. In 1989 a sample of just 
under 9,000 individuals were identified who were approaching their sixth 
month of unemployment. A random control group of 582 were selected 
who were not obliged to take part in the Restart interview. These individu- 
als were followed up in surveys three months and nine months after their 
first Restart interview (or nine months and thirteen months after the start 
The Effectiveness of Previous U.K. Reforms 
8. Martin (1998, 14) recounts one leading European policy maker’s frank explanation for 
this absence of good evaluations: “Most of our programs are lousy! They were dreamed up 
quickly to give the Minister some good news to announce at a time when unemployment is 
rising. We do not want evaluations revealing to the general public how bad our programs are; 
we know this already.” 
9. Disney et al. (1991) used the ratio of Restart interviews to eligible participants; Ander- 
ton, Riley, and Young (1999) and Riley and Young (2001b) use the number of New Deal par- 
ticipants as a share of the claimant count. Riley and Young (2001a) multiply the latter vari- 
able by the average number of days that individuals receive personal advisor interviews as 
their indicator of “New Deal intensity.” 476  John Van Reenen 
of their benefit claim, in the case of the control group). This information 
was matched to administrative records using their unique National Insur- 
ance (U.K. Social Security) numbers. 
Dolton and O'Neill (1995, 1996)'O analyze this data and find that the 
group who were randomized out of Restart had median unemployment 
duration one month longer than those who did receive Restart. They also 
examined the destinations of those leaving the claimant count using a 
competing risks model. They found that the strongest effects of Restart 
came from exits into  jobs rather than exits to training or nonparticipation. 
This Restart effect appeared to work through both increasing the arrival 
rate of job offers and by making the treated group more likely to accept a 
job if they received an offer. 
Some of  the job-subsidy  schemes have been  evaluated, but  usually 
through surveys without a good comparison group. One analysis of the 
Workstart pilots (where firms received a wage subsidy for employing the 
long-term unemployed) concluded that only 17 percent of the Workstart 
vacancies represented new employment that would not have existed with- 
out the subsidy and that much of the employment of the long-term unem- 
ployed occurred at the expense of the shorter-term unemployed (Atkinson 
and Meager 1994). 
11.3.4  The United Kingdom in International Context 
The  OECD estimates  of  spending  on  active  labor  market  policies 
(ALMP) across countries between 1985 and 1996 are given in table 11.4. 
These include administration of the public employment service (a rough 
proxy for resources in job assistance and job search monitoring), youth 
measures, training, public-sector job creation, subsidized private-sector 
jobs, and  job help for the disabled. The first column simply gives ALMP as 
a proportion of GDP. This might be seen as misleading as some countries 
will have different unemployment and wage levels than others. To partially 
deal with this, column (2) presents the standard OECD  measure of ALMP 
per person unemployed normalized on output per head. The figure can be 
regarded as analogous to a replacement rate with the generosity of spend- 
ing on ALMP per client compared to the outside wage (as proxied by out- 
put per head)." 
Despite the rhetoric, there has not been a rise in this measure of ALMP 
and GDP in the OECD as a whole over this period on either measure. If 
10. White and Leakey (1992), using the same data, also found that Restart significantly re- 
duced unemployment duration, increased the probability of finding a job, and increased the 
probability of moving into employment training. They could find no evidence that Restart re- 
duced the average quality of a job match either through lower wages or deteriorating job 
length. Surprisingly, however, there was no evidence that this effect was driven by increased 
job search (as measured by number ofjob applications, etc.). 
1 1. This variable is used in the cross-country comparisons of Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 
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anything, there has been a slight decline. There is a clear difference between 
the  main  continental  European  countries  and the  United  Kingdom. 
France and Germany both have higher spending per unemployed person, 
and both have increased their ALMP intensity. The United Kingdom not 
only spent less but also saw a decline over this period. Britain  appears 
closer to the United States, Japan, and Canada in this respect. 
The next three columns of table 1  1.4 decompose the spending of ALMP 
into its three main components-public  employment service, youth pro- 
grams, and government  jobs. The toughening of work search requirements 
in the United Kingdom is indicated by column [3]-there  has been a large 
increase in the proportion of resources devoted to the public employment 
service, from 22 percent in 1985 to 43 percent in 1996. In contrast there 
have been large falls in the proportionate spending on job creation in the 
public sector (from 25 percent to 2 percent) and to a lesser extent in youth 
programs (from 35 percent to 26 percent). 
The picture is different in continental Europe. Both France and Ger- 
many spend a larger proportion of resources on state  job  creation, and their 
proportionate spending on the public employment service has fallen be- 
tween 1985 and 1996. The trends are also in the opposite direction of the 
United  Kingdom. Again, the  United  Kingdom  is closer to the United 
States, who has also increased the resources going to public employment 
services (25 percent to 39 percent). Unfortunately, comparative data for 
those leaving the New Deal options are not yet available. Overall spending 
on ALMP  in the United Kingdom has almost certainly increased after 1997 
and is weighted more toward the youth component today than in 1996. 
The level of U.K. unemployment benefits is low compared to most other 
European countries (table 11.1). Offsetting this is the fact that the sanc- 
tions regime in the United Kingdom is only about average by international 
standards. The Netherlands, for example, has also managed to lower un- 
employment in the 1990s but, unlike the United Kingdom, has maintained 
a high replacement rate. The Dutch introduced  a very tough sanctions 
regime, however, to offset the disincentive effects of high replacement rates 
(see Nickell and van Ours, 2000, for a discussion). 
11.3.5  What Elements of the New Deal Might Work? 
Evidence from U.S. Research 
The New Deal Gateway provides both job-search assistance and job- 
search monitoring (with accompanying  sanctions  for noncompliance). 
The study reported in section 11.4 identifies a treatment effect over and 
above the impact of employment subsidy, but is this effect due to the “car- 
rot” of mentoring from the personal adviser or the “stick” of a harsher ben- 
efit regime? 
There is a large literature on the evaluation of the US.  unemployment in- 
surance (UI) system. The Social Security Act of 1935  created the UI system. 478  John Van Reenen 
Each state administers and implements its own system subject to federal 
guidelines. In particular, there is a requirement for work-search monitoring, 
although the precise way this is implemented varies by  state. There have 
been several demonstration projects (randomized trials) investigating the 
impact of variation in the way job-search monitoring and assistance im- 
pacts on the duration of claims and recipients’ employment and earnings. 
Meyer (1995) offers an excellent survey of five experiments.I2 He finds 
evidence that job-search monitoring and assistance together significantly 
reduce the duration of claims. There were less clear-cut effects on overall 
earnings.  Unfortunately  “[tlhis combination  of additional  services and 
tightened eligibility checks makes it difficult to determine what aspects of 
the experiments induced the changes in outcomes . . .” (Meyer 1995,114). 
Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Deschenes (1999) attempt to tackle this prob- 
lem by analyzing four experiments where the treatment of stricter enforce- 
ment and verification of work-search behavior can be separated from job 
as~istance.’~  They find no significant effects on claim duration from tighter 
monitoring. 
Anderson (2000) reports three further recent  experiment^.'^ Like Ashen- 
felter, Ashmore, and Deschenes (1999), the Maryland study allows a dis- 
tinction between job assistance and monitoring. The most stringent mon- 
itoring method, wherein each of the normal two contacts per week were 
verified, resulted in a fall in duration of 10 percent (about 1.5 weeks), com- 
pared to dropping of all job-search monitoring. The reason for the differ- 
ences between the two studies appears to be because the treatments in 
Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Deschenes (1 999) were relatively weak. The 
tougher monitoring of the job search was only in the first week after sub- 
mitting a claim for UI but before the claim was accepted. 
There have been several recent studies of the impact of reforms to the be- 
nefit regime in the Dutch labor market. Abbring, van den Berg, and van 
Ours (1997) and Van den Berg, van der Klaauw, and van Ours (1998) esti- 
mate that job-finding rates double after the imposition of a sanction. Van 
den Berg and van der Klaauw (2001) could find no effect of counseling and 
monitoring, but they argue that these interventions provided little signifi- 
cant  job-search assistance to the unemployed and were targeted mainly at 
groups who had relatively good labor market prospects. Gorter and Kalb 
(1 996) found that more intensive counseling to an eligible group with worse 
prospects had a significant impact on exits to employment. 
12. The experiments include the Nevada Claimant Placement Program, the Charleston 
Claimant Placement and Work Test Demonstration, the Wisconsin Eligibility Review Pilot 
Project, the New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration, and the Washington Alternative 
Work Search Experimentation. 
13. These sites were in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Virginia, and Tennessee. 
14. The experiments include the Utah Quality Control Program Improvement Study, the 
Maryland UI Work Search Demonstration, and the Job Search Assistance Demonstration in 
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In our U.K. results (section 11.4), we do not find evidence that individu- 
als were dropping off the rolls as they approached the start of the New Deal 
Gateway (between the fifth and sixth months of an unemployment spell- 
as we will see in table 11.7). If monitoring were extremely unpleasant, we 
would have expected more claimants to stop claiming prior to entering the 
New Deal (as appeared to happen with Restart). There is no significant 
change in outflows as the New Deal approaches; thus, we are inclined to 
believe that it is the carrot rather than the stick that has been most effective 
in delivering employment increases, a view shared by the qualitative evalu- 
ations of New Deal participants (eg,  Hasluck, 2000).15 
There is also a more extensive U.S. literature on the use of wage subsi- 
dies. Both Katz (1998) and Dickert-Conlin and Holtz-Eakin (2000) con- 
clude that employer-based subsidies have not proven successful. Katz ar- 
gues that part of this is due to stigma effects as only the most disadvantaged 
are typically able to get such subsidies, and this acts as a bad signal to po- 
tential employers. This may also explain why take-up rates are usually very 
low. Katz does find some evidence of an effect of the targeted job tax credit 
(TJTC) for disadvantaged youth in his own work. In section 1 1.4 I report 
results  of  using  a  similar  methodology  to  Katz,  exploiting  the  age- 
eligibility criterion to estimate the effect of the New Deal. 
Perhaps the closest experimental evidence for the New Deal is the U.S. 
Welfare to Work  programs.  Bloom  and  Michalopoulos  (2001) survey 
twenty-nine different initiatives that had demonstration projects (random 
assignments). Eight of these schemes were job-focused (rather than educa- 
tion or training focused) and mandatory for welfare recipients. Although 
the precise impact effect differed from program to program, a statistically 
significant effect of the program on employment probabilities was found in 
all eight cases. 
In this paper I do not examine the impact of the training and public- 
sector job element of the New Deal program due to lack of postoption 
data.16  There is a large US. literature on the impact of training programs 
for the unemployed and a rather smaller literature on the impact of public 
work program~.'~  Generally, the outcomes of evaluations of training pro- 
grams for young men have been disappointing.I8 It is worth remembering 
15. Only 2 percent of participants in the New Deal have suffered sanctions. 
16. Ronjour (2001) look at the relative success of different New Deal options using a spe- 
cial survey. They find that eighteen months after entering the New Deal, the employer option 
had the best outcomes in terms of getting people into work. 
17. For a survey of public service employment and mandatory work, see Ellwood and Welty 
(2000). 
18. See the survey in Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith (1999). The main argument is that most 
of these schemes fail to significantly raise the human capital of participants. A similar con- 
clusion is reached about U.K. public training schemes by Dolton (1992). Previous U.K. train- 
ing schemes have included Training Opportunities Programs (TOPS), the Youth Training 
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that the pool of young unemployed men in the United Kingdom is pro- 
portionately much larger than in the United States, so there may be greater 
scope for positive program effects. The U.S. target group of disadvantaged 
are more likely to be “hardcore” jobless whose human capital is very diffi- 
cult to raise. 
11.4  An Empirical Evaluation of the New Deal for Young People 
It is possible to examine the performance of the Gateway period of job 
assistance using publicly available microdata (for a full analysis, see Blun- 
dell, Costa Dias, Meghir, and Van Reenen 2001).’9 
We consider the treatment group to be young people unemployed for six 
months (continuous claims of JSA). The outcome of greatest interest is the 
flow of this group into employment over the four months of the Gateway 
period (months six through ten of JSA). We also examine all outflows from 
unemployment over the same period (e.g., to training). 
The New Deal treatment effect considered (the job outflow by month ten 
of unemployment) comprises the effects of both the job-assistance  and 
monitoring element of the New Deal and the wage-subsidy element.2o  It is 
possible to estimate a lower bound to the job assistance and subsidy ele- 
ment (unsubsidized jobs) as we know from administrative sources the ac- 
tual proportion of the unemployed who obtained subsidized jobs (these 
numbers are presented in the empirical results). By deducting the propor- 
tion that flow into the subsidized jobs from the overall treatment effect, one 
can obtain a lower bound of the pure Gateway effect. The “true” effect of 
job assistance is likely to be higher as some of those obtaining subsidized 
jobs would have obtained them even in the absence of a subsidy, despite the 
best efforts of the Employment Service to minimize this “deadweight.” 
In the absence of random assignment there are two possible ways to con- 
struct the comparison group. The first method is to exploit the fact that the 
New Deal was piloted in some areas ahead of  the National rollout. We 
compare nineteen-twenty-four-year-olds2’  in the pilot areas (Pathfinders) 
to similar nineteen-twenty-four-year-olds  in nonpilot areas over the same 
period of time before and after the introduction of the program, The sec- 
ond method is to examine an older age group who are ineligible for the New 
Deal. We choose to focus on twenty-five-thirty-year-olds  who have been 
19. This section is based on an analysis of the Joint Unemployment and Vacancies Operat- 
ing System (JUVOS) data, which contain information over time for a sample of 5 percent of 
those claiming unemployment-related benefits in the United Kingdom. 
20. Originally, I had hoped to deal with this problem by  focusing only on the first two 
months of the New Deal Gateway when no one was supposed to go on the wage-subsidy op- 
tion. Unfortunately, the New Deal Evaluation Database showed that some people went on the 
employer option even in the first month of the Gateway. 
21. We drop eighteen-year-olds because there has been a large increase in the participation 
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unemployed for six months as the comparison group. After the national 
rollout, only the comparison across age groups is possible. 
There are many potential biases in  using either of these comparison 
groups. Most pressing is the issue of substitution, that the older unem- 
ployed will be less likely to gain employment because firms will prefer New 
Deal participants (for example, firms receive a subsidy for employing a 
twenty-four-year-old but not a twenty-five-year-old).  Consequently, using 
the older age group may lead us to overestimate the positive effects of the 
New Deal. The Pathfinder pilots versus the non-Pathfinder pilot compari- 
son should be informative in this regard. Substitution effects imply that we 
should estimate smaller effects when comparing young people in pilot ver- 
sus nonpilot areas than when we  estimate using younger versus older indi- 
viduals within the pilot areas. Unlike the older group, young people within 
nonpilot areas are unlikely to be adversely affected by the New Deal. Sub- 
stitution also implies that we should, ceteris paribus, expect to see the out- 
flow rates of the older group decline in the pilot areas (where they are los- 
ing out to the younger group) compared to the nonpilot areas. 
This discussion illustrates that there is no one obviously “correct” age 
comparison  to consider. Using the regression discontinuity design ap- 
proach  of  comparing  eligible  twenty-four-year-olds  with  noneligible 
twenty-five-year-olds  has some appeal as we would expect these groups to 
be very similar in productivity characteristics. Unfortunately, substitution 
would be most severe for this age comparison because the twenty-five-year- 
olds would be the closest substitutes for the twenty-four-year-olds. Fur- 
thermore, the precision of the estimates falls as we  focus on smaller and 
smaller slices of the data. As a consequence, we  believe the five-year age 
groupings for treatment and control are the best balance, but we were also 
careful to investigate alternative age cutoffs in the empirical work. 
A second issue is that of equilibrium wage effects. If the New Deal re- 
duces equilibrium wage pressure (for example, through increased search) 
then we will be underestimating the effects of the New Deal in increasing 
employment. The use of different comparison groups may again be in- 
formative in this context. Consider the scenario where there are no substi- 
tution effects and only equilibrium wage effects in the local labor market. 
In this case, comparing young people in the pilot versus nonpilot areas will 
reflect some of the positive job effects associated with reduced wage pres- 
sure. Comparing younger versus older people within the Pathfinder areas 
will not capture the equilibrium wage effects as the job chances of both 
groups are improved. Thus, equilibrium wage effects imply that we  should 
estimate larger effects when comparing young people in pilot versus non- 
pilot areas than when we estimate using younger versus older individuals 
within the pilot areas. The bias is in the opposite direction of that of the 
substitution effect. 
Whichever comparison group is chosen, the method is to compare the 482  John Van Reenen 
difference in the outflow rates between these two groups after the New 
Deal began, compared to the difference in the outflow rates before the New 
Deal started. 
Table 11.5 contains the raw data on the outflow rates to jobs for the 
different groups. The data is taken from the Joint Unemployment and Va- 
cancies Operating System (JUVOS), an administrative longitudinal data- 
base. This follows a random 5 percent of  all individuals who have ever 
claimed unemployment benefits. The upper panel contains data from the 
pilot period and the lower panel from the national rollout. The pilot period 
considers those who reached six months on unemployment benefits (JSA) 
between January 1, 1998 and the end of March 1998 (“after the program”). 
I follow them four months later (i.e., ten months after they become unem- 
Table 11.5  Flows from the Claimant Count into Employment: Men (conditional  on being on 
Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) for six months) 
Flows by the End of the 8th 
Month on JSA 
Flows by the End of the 10th 
Month on JSA 
Before the  After the  Before the  After the 
Program  Program  Difference  Program  Program  Difference 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Pilot period 
1. Treatment group: 19-24- 
year olds in Pathfinder areas 
2. Comparison group: 19-24- 
year-olds in all other areas 
3. Difference in differences 
4. Comparison group: 19-24- 
year-olds in matched non- 
Pathfinder areas 
5. Comparison group: 25-30- 
year-olds in Pathfinder 
areas 
National rollout 
6. Treatment group: 19-24- 
year-olds 
7. Comparison group: 25-30- 
year-olds 
8. Difference in differences 
0.141  0.180  +0.039 
0.165  0.146  -0.019 
+0.058 
0.149  0.133  -0.016 
0.150  0.153  +0.003 
0.158  0.170  +0.012 
0.138  0.124  -0.014 
+  ,026 
0.241  0.330  +0.089 
0.271  0.250  -0.021 
+0.110 
0.228  0.233  +0.005 
0.276  0.260  -0.016 
0.258  0.281  +0.023 
0.230  0.199  -0.031 
+0.054 
Notes: Estimates used the Joint Unemployment and Vacancies Operating System (JUVOS) 5 percent 
longitudinal sample of JSA claimants. Selected observations are all unemployed individuals completing 
a six-month spell on JSA over a predefined time interval. The present table considers those obtaining six 
months of JSA between the second and fourth quarters of 1997 and 1998 for the national rollout esti- 
mates, and the first quarters of 1997 and 1998 for the pilot period estimates. Individuals verifying this cri- 
terion are then followed up to the end ofthe eighth and tenth months on JSA to check whether they have 
found a job. The eligible group (defined by the age or pilot area criterion) is compared with the selected 
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ployed). This group is compared with the same age group who reached six 
months on  unemployment benefits between January and March 1997 (“be- 
fore the program”). The national rollout considers individuals who reached 
six months on unemployment benefits between April 1, 1998 and Decem- 
ber 31, 1998 (“after the program”). They are compared with the same age 
group between April and December 1997 (“before the program”).22 
Focusing on the flows between six and ten months in the pilot period 
(row 1 column [6]  in table 11.5),  we can see that nineteen-twenty-four-year- 
olds were 8.9 percentage points more likely to obtain jobs in the post-New 
Deal period. In the nonpilot areas (row 2) nineteen-twenty-four-year-olds 
were actually less likely to get jobs (a fall of 2.1 percentage points). So the 
difference-in-differences effect is a full 11 percentage points (row 3)-an 
extremely large increase on a pretreatment base of 24.1 percent. The next 
two rows compare different possible comparison groups: “matched Path- 
finder areas” (where we  select areas with  similar characteristics to the 
Pathfinder areas) and twenty-five-thirty-year-olds  in the Pathfinder areas. 
The implied difference-in-differences effects are similar to the first com- 
parison group. The lower panel of table 1  1.5 examines data from the Na- 
tional rollout (post-April 1998). The magnitude of the New Deal effect is 
still positive but about half the size of that estimated for Pathfinder areas. 
There is an increase of 5.4 percentage points compared to the preprogram 
base of 25.8 percentage points (a 5.4125.8 = 20 percent increase in the out- 
flow rate). We show in the following that this is due to the return to a big 
“impact” effect in the first quarter that the New Deal is introduced. 
The raw difference-in-differences estimates in table 1  1.5 do not correct 
for compositional changes. These may be important if the composition of 
the groups changes systematically over time. In table 1 1.6 we include a set 
of extra controls-marital  status, sought occupation, region, the number 
of past unemployment spells, and the proportion  of  time spent unem- 
ployed in the previous two years. The final column contains our main re- 
sults. In row one we compare young people in pilot and nonpilot areas. In 
row two we compare younger people to older people within the pilot areas. 
The results are almost identical to the raw difference-in-differences esti- 
mates in table 11.5. The fact that the point estimates are both about 10-1  1 
percentage points regardless of whether we use area or age as the compar- 
ison group is interesting. It implies that we  cannot reject a simple model 
where there are no substitution or equilibrium wage effects of the pro- 
gram.23  It is reassuring that row three shows that the trends for the older 
22. An advantage of ceasing to examine any outflows after April 1999 is that the National 
Minimum Wage was first introduced in April 1999. Minimum-wage effects in analyses that 
cover this later period may confound the New Deal effects. 
23. It is also consistent with a more complex model where both of these effects cancel each 
other out. It may be, of course, that these effects take longer to play out due to lags of adjust- 
ment. Table 11.6  Regression Results for Gateway Employment Effects by the End of the 10th Month 
Men (conditional on being on Job Seekers Allowance [JSAl for six months; 
percentage point increase in the probability of leaving unemployment) 
Estimates Based on 
Comparison  No. of  Difference-in-Difference 
Treatment Group  Group  Observations  Method 
Pilot Period 
1. 19-24-year-olds living  19-24-year-olds living  3,716 
in Pathfinder areas  in all non-Pathfinder 
areas 
2. 19-24-year-olds living  25-30-year-olds living  1,096 
3.25-30-year-olds living  25-30-year-olds living  3,180 
4. 19-24-year-olds  living  3  I-40-year-olds living  1,169 
in Pathfinder areas  in Pathfinder areas 
in Pathfinder areas  in all other areas 
in Pathfinder areas  in Pathfinder areas 
5. 19-24-year-olds living  19-24-year-olds living  1,193 
in Pathfinder areas  in matched non- 
Pathfinder areas 
6. Outflow into the employment option (affecting 













Overall Effect for the Sample including the Pilot Period and the National Rollouth 
7. 19-24-year-olds  25-30-year-olds  17,433  0.053** 
(0.0 13) 
8. Outflows to subsidized jobsJ  55,051  0.039 
Deconiposition of New Deal into First Quarter and SecondlThird Quarter Effects 
9. Effect for the pilot  1,096  0.104* 
period-  1st quarter the  (0.055) 
program operates in 
Pathfinder areas 
10. Effect for the 1st 
quarter the program 
operates in non- 
Pathfinder areas 
1  I. Effect for the 2nd and 
3rd quarters the 








~~  ~  ~~~~  -  ~  ~ 
Source: Blundell, Costa Dias, Meghir, and Van Reenen (2001). 
Notes; Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates use the Joint Unemployment and Vacancies Oper- 
ating System (JUVOS)  5 percent longitudinal sample of JSA claimants. Selected observations are all un- 
employed individuals completing a 6-month spell on JSA over a predefined time interval. This table con- 
siders those obtaining six months of JSA between the second and fourth quarters of 1997 and 1998 for 
the national rollout estimates. The first quarters of 1997 and 1998 are used for the pilot period estimates. 
Individuals verifying this criterion are then followed up to the end of the tenth month on JSA to check 
whether they have found a job. The eligible group (defined by the age or pilot area criterion) is compared 
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Table 11.6  (continued) 
All estimates from regressions include a set of other controls, namely marital status, sought 
occupation, region, and some information on the labor market history (comprising the num- 
ber of JSA spells since 1982 and the proportion of time on JSA over the two years that pre- 
cede the start of the present unemployment spell). 
“Estimates of the outflows to options are obtained from the New Deal Evaluation Database 
(NDED). 
bFor the first three quarters, the New Deal is operating in each region. 
“The  decompositions are based on allowing the New Deal effect to differ in the first quarter it 
was introduced (January through March 1998 for the pilot period and March through May 
for the national rollout) from subsequent quarters. 
**Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*Significant at the 0.10 level. 
groups were statistically identical in Pathfinder areas to non-Pathfinder ar- 
eas. If young people were being substituted for older age groups in the pi- 
lot areas, one would have expected worse outcomes for the twenty-five- 
thirty-year-olds in the pilot areas. This does not appear to be the case. We 
compare the young unemployed to a slightly older age group (thirty-one- 
forty) in row four and to matched non-Pathfinder areas in row five. These 
results show (if anything) a slightly larger New Deal effect.24 
Note that 5.7 percent of the sample  joined the subsidized  job option dur- 
ing the program (row 6). This enables us to put a lower bound on the effect 
of  the job-assistance element of  the  program  of  about  5.3 percentage 
points (i.e., 11 percent-5.7  percent). Even if none of those who were given 
subsidized jobs would have obtained them in the absence of the program, 
there remains a 5.3 percentage point outflow into unsubsidized jobs at- 
tributable to the New Deal.2s  If half of all subsidized jobs are deadweight, 
then the effect of job assistance and monitoring rises to 8.15 percentage 
points (1 1 percent-2.85  percent). 
The final three rows of table 11.5 examine the “program introduction” 
effect. It is noticeable that the employment impact of the New Deal was 
greater in the first quarter that it was introduced (both in the pilot areas 
and the nonpilot areas after the national rollout) than in the subsequent 
two quarters. Comparing rows eight and nine (first quarter) with row ten 
(second and third quarter) illustrates that the program introduction effect 
appears twice as large as the subsequent impact. Other U.K. labor market 
programs have also experienced “cleaning out the register” impact effects. 
But these are usually thought to stem from improved administrative pro- 
24. Other studies have also failed to uncover significant substitution effects  in the New Deal 
program (e.g., Anderton, Riley, and Young 1999; Riley and Young 2001a). 
25. The design of the program emphasized finding unsubsidized employment when partic- 
ipantsfirst entered the New Deal. So the true effect ofjob  assistance may be close to this lower 
bound. The greater impact of some U.S. and Dutch assistance schemes may have been be- 
cause the target group had been employed for shorter periods of time. 486  John Van Reenen 
cedures and reductions in fraud. It is more likely that the impact effect of 
the New Deal came from the energizing of personal advisers in the Em- 
ployment Service who greeted the New Deal with a lot of enthusiasm. This 
naturally diminishes over time. It would be unwise, however, to consider 
the post-first  quarter lower figure as the “steady state” effect as it is still 
based on only six months of data. 
There are many criticisms of these results that are partially taken up in 
table 11.7. First, we examined whether the quality of job matches had de- 
teriorated by using the outflow to  jobs that lasted at least thirteen weeks as 
the outcome variable.26  The treatment effect is very close to that for all jobs, 
so there is no evidence that New Deal jobs are of significantly lower qual- 
ity, on this measure at least. Second, it may be that individuals are delaying 
their exits from unemployment prior to the New Deal in order to take ad- 
vantage of the generosity of the program. If this was the case, one would 
expect to see a decline in outflows in the month before the program starts. 
The third row of table 11.7 shows that there are no selectivity effects be- 
tween month five and six of JSA (we could also find no New Deal effects 
on earlier months of JSA). 
The third experiment we consider uses outflows to all destinations as 
the outcome variable (row 4). The New Deal effect is much larger-double 
the effect on employment. But this is to be expected as a much larger pro- 
portion of individuals flow onto some kind of option (13.7 percent of the 
sample in row 5). Also, the baseline proportion exiting to all destinations is 
much higher than to  jobs alone. 
The analysis focuses on men because three-quarters of all New Deal par- 
ticipants are male. We also found that the pre-New Deal outflow behavior 
of twenty-fiveethirty-year-old  women was trending in a very different way 
from that of nineteen-twenty-four-year-old  women, whereas it was similar 
for men. These differential trends relate to changing patterns of participa- 
tion due to children. Nevertheless we  can still examine the pilot versus 
nonpilot experiments, as the outflow trends for young women were similar 
in pilot and nonpilot areas. The results are shown in row six of table 11.7. 
The point estimates are smaller than those of men (6 percent compared to 
10 percent), although the smaller sample size means that the coefficients 
are very imprecisely estimated. 
Finally, one could consider using other age cutoffs than the ones that 
we chose to focus on. For example, in the spirit of regression discontinuity 
design (see Hahn and Van der Klaauw 1999), one could simply compare 
twenty-four-year-olds  with twenty-five-year-olds (rather than nineteen- 
twenty-four-year-olds  with  twenty-five-twenty-nine-year-olds).  As  dis- 
cussed previously, this has the advantage that the two groups will be sub- 
26.  There is, unfortunately, no information on earnings in JUVOS. The survey information 
in Hales et al. (2000) suggests that the New Deal participants are earning only slightly above 
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Table 11.7  Regression Results of Further Investigations of the New Deal Effect (percentage 
point increase in the probability of leaving unemployment) 
Experiment 
Estimates Based on 
No. of  Difference-in-Difference 
Observations  Method 
Pilot Period 
Men 






3. Outflows to employment  between 5th and 6th 
months of JSA 
4. Outflows to all destinations (19-24-year-olds vs. 
25-30-year-olds from the national rollout areas 
and Pathfinder areas 
19-24-year-olds) 
2. Outflows to sustained subsidized jobs (affecting 
5. Outflows to all New Deal options (affecting  55,051 
Women 
6. Outflows to employment (using 19-24-year-olds in 
Pathfinder vs. 19-24-year-olds in non-Pathfinder 
areas) 
1,169 
Pilot Period with Nutional Rollout 
1,693  7. Women: Outflow into the employment option 
(affecting 19-24-year-olds in the Pathfinder 
areas) 
vs. 25-29-year-olds) 
8. Men: Using 24- vs. 25-year-olds (instead of 19-24-  2,767 
0.045** 












Source: Blundell, Costa Dias, Meghir, and Van Reenen (2001). 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates of the effects of the New Deal used the Joint Un- 
employment and Vacancies Operating System (JUVOS) 5 percent longitudinal sample of Job Seekers 
Allowance (JSA) claimants. The table considers those obtaining six months of JSA between the second 
to fourth quarters of 1997 and 1998 for the national rollout estimates. The first quarters of 1997 and 1998 
are used for the pilot period estimates. Individuals verifying this criterion are then followed up  to the end 
of the tenth month on JSA to check whether they have found a job. The eligible group (defined by the 
age or pilot area criterion) is compared with the selected control group. 
All estimates are from regressions include a set of other controls, namely marital status, sought occu- 
pation, region, and some information on the labor market history (comprising  the number of JSA spells 
since 1982 and the proportion of time on JSA over the 2 years that precede the start of the present un- 
employment spell). 
"Estimates  of the outflows to options are obtained from the New Deal Evaluation Database (NDED). 
**Significant at the 0.05 level 
*Significant at the 0.10 level. 
ject to the same trends, but the disadvantage that substitution effects (if 
they exist) will be strongest for these age groups. The results of this exper- 
iment are contained in row eight. The treatment effect is larger in magni- 
tude (0.068), although not significantly different from the baseline effect 
(0.053),  which is unsurprising given the much smaller sample size. 488  John Van Reenen 
In conclusion, the range of experiments contained in table 1 1.7 suggests 
that the results are quite robust. 
11.5  Cost-Benefit Calculation 
Any cost-benefit analysis must proceed with a large degree of caution 
due to the uncertainty surrounding key parameters. Nevertheless, it is im- 
portant to try and put the numbers into perspective, no matter how crudely 
(see table 1 1.8 for a summary and appendix for more details). The analysis 
is forward looking-I  seek to investigate whether the New Deal would be 
a program that would be worth making a permanent feature of the U.K. la- 
bor market. 
One of the main benefits of the New Deal is the number of jobs (and 
therefore extra output) created. To estimate the number of jobs, a number 
of assumptions have to be made regarding the counterfactual. I simulate 
the change in steady state for an economy that broadly matched the U.K. 
economy in 1998 when the New Deal was introduced. 
Table 11.8  Preliminary Cost Benefit Analysis of New Deal (in imillions) 
Item 
Baseline 
Description  (1) 
Optimistic  Pessimistic 
(2)  (3) 
Key assumptions 
1. Increased out- 
put from jobs 
Exchequer cost 
2. Gross 
3. Benefit and tax 
savings 
4. Direct cost of 
Gateway 
5. Net Exchequer 
6. Excess burden 
of taxation 
7. Total social 
cost 
costs 
8. Net Social 
Benefit 
No. of new jobs X 
average earnings 
Transfers to parti- 
cipants in New 
Deal, direct cost 
of Gateway, etc. 
JSA, Housing 
Benefit, income 
tax and NI, etc. 
Personal advisers, 
etc. 
(Item 2) -(Item 3) 
(Item 5)  X excess 
burden (1  5%) 
(Item 4) + (Item 6) 
(Item 1) -  (Item 7) 
Employment up 










Employment up  Employment up 
by 17,250 (average 
wage &8,500)  wage f7.272) 
146.6  98.8 
by  15,000 (average 
250.3  254.2 
156.1  133.6 
52.9  55.0 
94.2  120.6 
14.1  18.1 
67.0  73.1 
79.6  25.7 
Notes: See appendix and section 11.5 for details of the calculations. Active Labor  Market  Policies and the British New Deal  489 
The estimates from the previous section showed that the effect of the 
New Deal was to raise the employment outflows (see table 1  1.5) of young 
men by 5.3 percentage points-an  elasticity of about 0.2 (i.e., 5 percentage 
points over a presample base of 25.8 percent). I consider three main labor 
market states only (employment, short-term or under six months of unem- 
ployment, and long-term or over six months of unemployment). I then 
simulate a permanent increase in monthly outflow rates from long-term 
unemployment to employment using this elasticity of 0.2 (keeping all the 
other outflow rates constant) and solve for the new steady states stocks. 
The stock of long-term unemployment (including those in the Gateway 
and on nonjob options) falls by about 20,000 per year, and the employment 
level rises by  17,250.?’ The number of short-term unemployed  rises by 
2,850 because employment is higher and the outflow rate from employ- 
ment to short-term unemployment is unchanged (by assumption). 
I use the estimates of the mean starting wages of workers on the New 
Deal subsidized job option from the survey in Hales et al. (2000) of E3.78 
per hour,28  average annual earnings are  just under &7300.  Using this as our 
measure of output leads to a social benefit of El25 million (row one). 
On the costs side, we have a gross exchequer cost in row two of &250  mil- 
lion29  (about El00 million in allowances for the various New Deal options, 
&50  million for the Gateway and 5100 million for the resource inputs into 
the options). We have to deduct off (1) the fact that unemployment and 
other benefits were already being paid to these individuals, and (2) those 
individuals that gain jobs and enjoy higher allowances will be paying some 
more tax. These items total El49 million (row three). In addition, some of 
these costs are transfers, so these will contribute only to social costs due to 
the excess burden of taxation (the deadweight loss involved in a higher level 
of taxation). Using an excess burden rate of 15 percent, this is about &15 
million (row six). On the other hand, the cost of maintaining the Gateway 
is a real productive cost due to the diversion of resources from other parts 
of the economy. There are also real resource costs involved in supplying the 
options, but (following Layard 2000) I assume the benefits of taking an op- 
tion (e.g., the increased human capital associated with training) perfectly 
offset these costs. Summing the excess burden and Gateway gives a total so- 
cial cost of just over &68  million. 
27. This is consistent with the more macro-based approaches. Anderton, Riley, and Young 
(1999) estimate an employment impact of the New Deal for Young People of 18,000  between 
January 1998 and October 1999. Riley and Young (2001b) estimate that the New Deal for 
Young people has increased youth employment by 15,000 per year between March 1998 and 
March 2000. 
28. This may be an underestimate as it does not take into  account wage growth over the year 
and the fact that those on the New Deal subsidy may be less productive than those who left 
the Gateway for an unsubsidized  job. 
29. This is lower than the numbers in table 1  1.3  because our analysis  is in long run. In steady 
state the New Deal has reduced the equilibrium numbers of the long-term unemployed, so to- 
tal costs are lower. 490  John Van Reenen 
The social cost is much less than social benefits of the extra output gen- 
erated, so there ends up being an annual net social benefit of the program 
ofjust over &57  million. The figure is lower than that of the El00 million net 
benefit in Layard (2000), mainly because I empirically estimate slightly 
smaller effects of the New Deal on unemployment and employment than 
those on which Layard bases his calculations. Furthermore, I use actual 
rather than assumed wage gains. Nevertheless, I concur with his conclusion 
that the social benefits of the New Deal are likely to outweigh its social 
costs. 
The other two columns of table 11.8 show the sensitivity of these calcu- 
lations to changes in key assumptions. Column (2) assumes optimistically 
that average annual earnings of those getting jobs from the New Deal are 
&8500.  This increases the net benefits to about &80  million. The final col- 
umn makes one change from the first column by pessimistically assuming 
that the employment effect is only 15,800, (1 standard error below the esti- 
mated effect in table 1  1.6). The net benefit falls to &26  million, half of that 
in column (1). This illustrates the importance of the magnitude of the em- 
ployment effect in determining overall benefits. If the employment effect 
fell to 14,000,  then the social costs and benefits are broadly equal. 
This analysis probably underestimates the value of the program for three 
reasons. First, it does not take into account the social benefits of reduced 
crime, teenage pregnancy, and so on. Second, it does not factor in the re- 
distributive effects from  relatively wealthy  older  taxpayers  to the  less 
wealthy young unemployed. Finally, we do not estimate the extent to which 
the New Deal program enhances the employability and productivity of in- 
dividuals who participate in the options. We merely assume that the re- 
source input per New Dealer is not more than the present value of the ben- 
efit received. On the other hand, the welfare benefits may be overstated as 
we have not given any weight to the value of leisure for the unemployed. 
The job assistance element of the New Deal is more cost effective than 
the New Deal options as there is no subsidy involved. The lower bound of 
the job-assistance and monitoring effect works out to increase steady state 
employment by about 8,000. 
Existing U.S. evaluations are rather pessimistic about the ability of tem- 
porary  government jobs and training  schemes  to  raise  the  long-term 
prospects of the young unemployed, especially young rnen.’O It is worth re- 
membering, however, that the U.S. schemes focus on extremely disadvan- 
taged youth who may be from a comparatively lower part of the ability dis- 
tribution than the New Deal participants considered here (especially for 
men). The success of the employment subsidy option will also hinge on the 
extent to which the experience of work and training will raise productivity, 
thereby enabling workers to keep their jobs when the subsidy runs out 
(Bell, Blundell, and Van Reenen 1999). 
30. For a recent survey, see White, Auspos, and Richhio (1999) Active Labor Market Policies and the British New Deal  491 
11.6  Conclusions 
In this chapter I have examined the British New Deal for the Young Un- 
employed. This is a major program to enhance the employment rates of 
eighteen-twenty-four-year-olds.  The youth labor market is an important 
issue in most countries, especially in Europe where the unemployment 
rates of the young are well above the OECD average. 
The main finding is from the analysis of outflow rates to  jobs before and 
after the introduction of the New Deal. The program appears to have had 
a significant effect in moving more young people into jobs. According to 
our estimates, young unemployed men are about 20 percent more likely to 
find jobs each month because of the New Deal. I estimate that the New 
Deal has lead to an increase in “steady state” youth employment of over 
17,000. 
The New Deal should be seen as the latest step in the progressive moves 
in Britain to tighten the obligation to search for work while claiming un- 
employment benefits. This process began with the Restart reform of 1986 
that made work-focused interviews compulsory for those on longer unem- 
ployment durations. One important difference, however, is that the New 
Deal is much more generous in providing advice and hard cash (e.g., for 
wage subsidies and training) than previous reforms. 
A “reengineered” New Deal has continued since the Labour Party’s re- 
election in 2001. The government has put greater emphasis on intensifying 
the job search and extending mandatory options for an ever-larger pro- 
portion of benefit recipients. The employers’ wage subsidy is the element 
that is most vulnerable to being cut, due to its low take-up. Such a cut could 
be premature. As this paper has shown, the wage subsidy appears to have 
had a significant impact on increasing jobs (at least in the first few months 
on the program). The long-term success of the New Deal hinges critically 
upon improving employment prospects through the acquisition of better 
job skills, either in the Gateway period or, more likely, during one of the op- 
tions. It will take some time to monitor the extent to which these dynamic 
gains in worker productivity really have been boosted by the New Deal. 
Taken as a whole, though, the program is judged to be a modest success 
at a modest cost. Its social benefits appear to outweigh its social costs. 
Appendix 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
I perform a forward-looking analysis of the effects of the New Deal for 
Young People. Assuming the stock of people unemployed for more than 
six months has been eliminated, the New Deal for Young People will have 492  John Van Reenen 
its effect on the flow of eighteen-twenty-four-year-olds  unemployed for six 
months. 
I begin with our estimates of the effects of the New Deal on increasing 
outflows. The baseline estimate (table 1 1.6, row seven) is that New Deal has 
increased the probability  of leaving unemployment  for a job by  0.205 
(=0.053/0.258). We assume that this elasticity is true for all groups (men 
and women, whatever duration of unemployment over six months, etc.). 
I perform a simulation exercise for a counterfactual economy matched 
to the features of the U.K. economy in 1998.  There are three states: employ- 
ment, short-term unemployment (under six months), and long-term unem- 
ployment (over six months). Individuals on the nonemployer options are 
treated as long-term unemployed for the purpose of calculating the stocks. 
I assume that the labor force for young people is fixed at 1.875 million. 
Initially there are 125,000 long-term unemployed; 250,000 short-term un- 
employed; and 1.5 million employed. With an outflow rate of 10 percent, 
this implies an impact effect of an additional monthly outflow of 2,562 (= 
O.l"O.205" 125), or 31,000 per year. In steady state, however, the stocks will 
adjust to the new outflow rates so the equilibrium flows and stocks will be 
different. Under the assumption that the New Deal only impacts on the 
flow rate between long-term unemployment and employment, we can solve 
for the new steady-state levels of the three labor market states. Long-term 
unemployment falls by 20,088. Of these individuals, 17,250  enter the stock 
of employment, and 2,840 become short-term unemployed. 
To compute the benefits we assume that young people who get jobs as a 
result of the New Deal produce an amount equal to the corresponding 
wage. Hales et al. (2000) report on a survey of people on the employer op- 
tion that suggests an average hourly wage of E3.78. Assuming a thirty- 
seven-hour week, this implies annual earnings of E7,272. So one clear be- 
nefit is the increase in employment, multiplied by annual earnings (17,250 
X E7,272 = E125.4 million). 
Other benefits include the gross output of the voluntary and environ- 
mental options and the value of training. 
On the cost side we have to include 
The resource cost of the Gateway period (although there was already 
something like this under the previous JSA regime). These are mainly 
administrative costs, such as the salaries of personal advisers. 
The transfers to individuals and firms involved with New Deal op- 
tions. These only matter from a social point of view because of the ex- 
cess burden of taxation. This has to be calculated from the increased 
additional taxation necessary to finance the New Deal. There are 
transfer payments to employers through subsidized jobs and to par- 
ticipants through the other options. I assume that in steady state there 
are 12,000  participants on the subsidized job option.  Of the long-term Active Labor Market Policies and the British New Deal  493 
unemployed  72 percent are in the Gateway or Follow-Through, 14 
percent are in the full-time education and training option, and 14 per- 
cent are in the Environmental Task Force or voluntary-sector option. 
These proportions approximate those in 1999. The subsidies given to 
each of these groups is defined by the program (see section 1 1.3.2). The 
sum of these is the gross exchequer cost. We must deduct from this the 
benefit payments that would have been received by young unemployed 
people if the New Deal did not exist. Also, we include the additional 
taxes received by  the Revenue. This net exchequer cost is the addi- 
tional tax that needs to be raised, and this will have a deadweight cost 
associated with it. Note that the transfers themselves are not included 
in the social costs. 
The annual cost of JSA (&2,080)  for all those on New Deal options (to 
calculate the benefit savings). For those who are employed as a result 
of the New Deal, there are also potential savings in housing benefits 
(&2,080  on a rent of f40 per week) and council tax benefits (about 
&468),  but not all participants on the New Deal can claim these (e.g., 
if they live with their parents). I extracted data on eighteen-twenty- 
four-year-olds on JSA using the FES. About 40 percent of the relevant 
group claimed these benefits, so I weighted the value by this propor- 
tion. For the employed group I used the wage (&7,200)  to calculate in- 
come tax and national insurance (about E472 and E361, respectively, 
for those on &7,300  per year). Finally, as net disposable income has 
risen,  consumption will  rise  and there  will  be  a  further  tax  take 
through value added taxes (VAT) and excise duties. Taking all these el- 
ements into account implies an average tax and benefits saving of 
around E3,600 for each person who moves off unemployment as a re- 
sult of the New Deal. 
The resource costs of the New Deal options. We make the simplifying 
assumption that the output of the voluntary and environmental op- 
tions is equal to the resource costs. One would expect that the output 
is rather higher. We also assume that the value of training is equal to 
the resource input. This is controversial as most U.S.  studies find little 
effect of training on unemployed youth. The New Deal courses are, 
however, typically much longer than those in U.S. programs (up to 
twelve months in full-time education), so the assumption is not un- 
reasonable. 
I have not put any value on the lost leisure time of those who were unem- 
ployed but are now productively engaged in different activities. 
These calculations ignore many of the potential benefits of the New 
Deal. First, it does not take into account the social benefits of reduced 
crime, teenage pregnancy, and so on. Second, it does not factor in the re- 
distributive effects from  relatively wealthy  older  taxpayers  to the  less 494  John Van Reenen 
wealthy young unemployed. Finally, we do not estimate the extent to which 
the New Deal program enhances the employability and productivity of in- 
dividuals who participate in the options. We merely assume that the re- 
source input per New Dealer is not more than the present value of the be- 
nefit received. 
The calculations also assume that there are no substitution effects or 
general equilibrium effects. The former would increase the costs, and the 
latter would increase the benefits. Strong evidence of large substitution or 
major general equilibrium effects was not uncovered in section 1 1.4. 
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